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Category Archives: Public Health

Public health technologies; public goods and public health; policies toward health and safety at work; health education; financing public health; public health and public behavior; interplay between public health and health care services; inter- play between public health and other sectors; economics of public health policy.

Is this recession good for your health?

There have been a good number of articles to document the phenomenon of a counter-cyclical relationship between unemployment and health. As unemployment rises, deaths from a number of causes have been found to decline. These include accidents, infant mortality, heart disease, and liver disease (Ruhm, 2000; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2004). That such a relationship is observed may at first seem counterintuitive; the reduction in income must surely damage our health. But, there are a number of reasons why we may see this relationship:

  1. Opportunity cost of time: In economic upturns leisure time decreases and health improving behaviours such as exercise decrease. Thus, in an economic downturn, since our time is less precious we have more time to engage in time-intensive and health-promoting activities. We could even visit the doctor more.
  2. Health as an input to production: The production of goods and services requires healthy people. But this production may be hazardous or stress-inducing. Furthermore, some of the most hazardous sectors, such as construction, are the most affected by economic downturns.
  3. External sources of death: Less time spent commuting means less time on the road and so fewer vehicular accidents. We may also see less drink driving, which is more common in economic upturns.
  4. Income effect: Our consumption of alcohol and tobacco as well as other goods that damage our health may decline.

On the back of this evidence, I asked myself, has this effect been present in the UK during the current Great Recession? Overall, unemployment has risen over the last five years, and the average weekly wage has declined in real terms (thanks to @peterpannier for the graph):

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A proper analysis of the data would be a full paper, something that someone, somewhere, may be in the process of writing – but, for the purposes of a preliminary investigation, let’s just look at the raw data. The 2011 census asked people how they would rate their health and provided them with five possible responses from ‘very good’ through to ‘very bad’. The census also provides us with the number of economically active but unemployed individuals. All this information is aggregated at the level of lower super output area (LSOA); of which there are around 32,000 in the UK each with a population of around 1,500. The following figure shows a plot of the proportion of unemployed individuals (as a proportion of 16-74 year olds) against the proportion reporting ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ health:

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Clearly, there is a strong upward trend; areas with more unemployed have more people reporting bad health. Does this contradict our initial hypothesis? One of the crucial points about the aforementioned arguments are that they are arguments to explain the relationship between a change in health and a change in economic circumstances. The papers cited above used a fixed effects analysis; an analysis to examine the effects of changes. Thus, the correlations in the figure above may be picking up structural unemployment: we may be seeing the relationship between health and unemployment for those for whom the recession doesn’t affect health behaviour because they don’t experience a change as they are already unemployed. So let’s look instead at the relationship between short-term unemployment and the proportion reporting ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ health. I defined short term unemployed here as having last been employed in 2011, i.e. a maximum of three months prior to the census. I looked at this in two ways; firstly, by looking at the number of short term unemployed as a proportion of the total number of people between 16 and 74:

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As you can see, there is now a downward trend, albeit not very steep. One issue is that areas with high short-term unemployment may also have high long-term unemployment making it hard to distinguish their effects. Therefore, my second approach was to look at the proportion of short term unemployed as a proportion of the total unemployed:

Click for larger image

Now there is clearly a strong downward trend. At a superficial level, these data seem to preliminarily support the hypothesis that short-term changes to unemployment may improve health. However, we also see that long-term unemployment is related to negative health. This is certainly not unexpected.

It is well evidenced that longer spells of unemployment lead to a reduced probability of finding work. From the macroeconomic point of view, the longer a downturn in the economy lasts, the greater the structural unemployment. This, as the above data suggest, may therefore lead to a reduction in average population health. Reducing unemployment and the duration of employment spells is certainly important but an ambitious policy goal. A better understanding of how socioeconomic deprivation and poor health are related would identify other methods to combat this negative effect on health.

These data may also shine a different light on Keynes’s well quoted line that ‘In the long run we are all dead’.

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Some thoughts on evidence-based policy

I’m currently reading Les Mis (I have been for about 2 years – it’s half a million words long). A few months ago, Hugo described economists to me as “geologists of politics” (géologues de la politique). A pretty smart observation for 1862. It reminded me of a slightly more recent quip by Oswald Falk; telling his friend John Maynard Keynes that all he had really done was codify “the moral feeling of an age”.

Economic theory often follows political theory, no doubt, and policy can follow from either. But there are now calls in the UK for ‘evidence’ to enter the equation; most recently in eduction. In regard to economic and public policy, the argument is presumably that the story should go:

political theory > economic theory > evidence > policy.

A loose parallel in medicine might go:

medical theory > treatment > evidence > policy.

In medicine this is usually feasible, as human biology is relatively predictable. It is reasonably clear how medical questions can be answered; usually by randomised controlled trials and epidemiological studies. But is the step from theory to evidence as simple in public policy?

Evidence-based policy

In public policy, the story rarely goes as described above; evidence can fall anywhere in the schema – usually at the end. Evidence is retrospective, while policy is prospective. Human evolution is relatively slow, and what a drug does to a person now it is likely to do in 12 months’ time. Evidence collected in a trial is therefore largely applicable in the future. The same cannot be said for economies and societies. Evidence becomes heavily dependent on projections of what will happen in the future, and we (economists, humans) are notoriously bad at making predictions.

Evidence-based medicine (future edition)

Medicine is less dependent on projections, so evidence-based medicine is usually a safe bet. However, with the rise of personalised medicine, evidence-based medicine as we know it could be off the table. In personalised medicine, n=1. It won’t be possible to stratify trials by the four quadrillion different human genetic combinations; let alone different socio-economic indicators. Furthermore, some pressing questions are proving to be beyond the scope of evidence and prediction. For example, Richard Smith and Joanna Coast recently highlighted the limitations of evidence in antimicrobial resistance.

I’m all in favour of evidence-based medicine, as I’m not a moron! I’m also in favour of evidence-based policy wherever we can do it. But we need to acknowledge its limitations and avoid hubris whenever we do have ‘evidence’. Health economists live in a very evidence-based world, which is no bad thing, but we mustn’t restrict ourselves to it. We need to consider that, if we can’t find evidence of support for a policy (say, attaching a greater weight to end of life care), it may be that our theory is wrong.

When would the NHS have been created, had we waited for the evidence (or economic theory, for that matter)? How long can we wait for evidence in the case of antimicrobial resistance? In the long run we could all, quite literally, be dead. Sometimes it will be necessary to charge forward with policies that we know are right, but just can’t prove. The economists will add the veneer of theory later.

 

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A minimum price for alcohol

The current UK government is toying with the idea of introducing a minimum price for alcohol in England and Wales of around 45p per unit. However, just this week it was revealed that some senior cabinet members opposed the policy; putting it in jeopardy.

As with any policy there is a burden of evidence. The impact of such a policy should be established as best as possible. Basic economic arguments and the current evidence about alcohol may or may not lead us to expect that the policy would: i) reduce overall consumption (income effect), ii) increase consumption of other drugs (substitution effect), iii) not affect consumption of alcohol among alcoholics (inelastic demand among addicts), and iv) reduce the welfare of the poorest households (tighter budget constraint).

As was discussed in a previous post, based on arguments presented by David Nutt, the primary policy goal should be a reduction in the harm caused by alcohol; not a reduction in the prevalence of alcohol consumption. Of the above effects, presumably only the first is what the government desires; and, since it is a minimum price increase, only those who purchase the cheapest alcohol would see an income effect. The understanding is that alcoholics are the ones who would thusly be affected. But this leads to point iv); poor households who are not problematic drinkers would see an increase to the price of alcohol, while wealthier households who purchase more expensive alcohol (fine wine is a luxury good, cheap cider an inferior good), wouldn’t be affected. Yet there is certainly evidence (e.g. here and here) to suggest that alcohol consumption among the middle classes is problematic.

A precursory glance at the literature reveals the evidence of the effect of a minimum price of alcohol is fairly limited. It does reveal that, in Canada, it was found that a 10% increase in the minimum price of alcohol led to both a reduction in alcohol consumption and a 31.7% reduction in alcohol-attributable deaths. Epidemiological models set in the UK estimate the same effect.

The purpose of this policy does seem to be prevention of alcohol-related disease. But changing the minimum price of alcohol doesn’t address many of the issues surrounding the causes and effects of alcohol addiction; in particular, the effect of socioeconomic status. Higher socioeconomic status individuals are at least as likely to consume risky amounts of alcohol but appear to be less at risk of the adverse consequences. Indeed, one way of abrogating these effects would be to reduce consumption among the lower status individuals, but this would certainly be inequitable. It is widely accepted that there is a relationship between low socioeconomic status and alcohol addiction due to adverse social factors and poor life circumstances with the arrow of causality pointing in both directions. Perhaps addressing socioeconomic problems could be a more effective solution.

 

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