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Considering time perception

In economic evaluations in health, time matters. More time in a bad health state is necessarily worse (or no better) than a smaller amount of time in said health state. Likewise, the value of an intervention increases with the duration of benefit. The standard QALY framework takes this into account. Furthermore, time preferences matter. Economists deal with this in a present value framework; discounting future costs and benefits. But there is another aspect of time which is not taken into account; time perception. Issues surrounding our perceptions of time recently appeared in the usual pop science outlets following the release of Claudia Hammond’s new book ‘Time Warped‘. As medical, neurological and psychological understandings of time perception improve, is it time economists weighed in?

Economists have considered the effects upon time perception of things like ‘awe‘ and the cognitive resource demands of tasks, while others have investigated the interaction between time preferences and time perceptions. It seems none have investigated the implications for an area in which time perceptions might play their most important role; health.

Why might it matter?

Time is an abstract idea, but economists rarely treat it as such. This means that people’s perceptions of time are overlooked. This may be a reasonable approach if we are working at the mean and people’s perceptions of time are consistent across health states. But what if they aren’t? Consider a basic illustrative QALY example:

  • Scenario A: 2 weeks in 0.8 health, followed by 2 weeks in full health
  • Scenario B: 1 week in 0.6 health, followed by 3 weeks in full health

Clearly these scenarios give the same QALY result. If one perceives time to pass more slowly in a worse health state then we might be able to add to the scenarios that in ‘A’ the first 2 weeks “feels like 3 weeks”, while in ‘B’ the first week “feels like 2 weeks”. If we were to weight the QALY values in these periods according to perceived time we would have a preference for scenario A. With these re-weightings, 2 weeks of 0.8 in scenario A would become equivalent to 2 weeks of 0.53, while 1 week of 0.6 in scenario B would become equivalent to 1 week of 0.3; increasing the difference between the two health states.

Applications

We all experience fluctuations in our own time perception. Time flies when we’re having fun. It might fly when we’re healthy too. It may be the case that a general and testable model of time perception exists in health. The most likely relationship seems to be that being in poorer health would be associated with a perception of time moving more slowly. There may also be differences in time perception between different groups of people (men and women, children and the elderly) that we may or may not want to adjust for. Some interesting implications of time perceptions for the burden of waiting times have already been identified.

Particular health conditions can affect an individual’s perception of time, and this is where the consideration of time perceptions could be crucial. Children with ADHD, for example, have been shown to perceive time in very different ways to those without ADHD. Likewise, cancer patients with evidence of disease have been found to perceive time as progressing more slowly, compared with those without. If a condition causes individuals to perceive time to move more slowly in a consistent and measurable way, then specific rules could be established to assign greater weight to treatments for said condition.

Implications

The relationships above are all testable and quantifiable. Time perceptions can be easily tested by denying well and unwell patients access to a clock and calendar, and then asking them about the ways in which they perceived their time in these states. It is important to note that during these times our perception of time may be affected by other things; whether we are confined to a hospital bed, stuck in the office or asleep at home. All of these things could be controlled for in an experiment.

The real question is whether or not we (the public) want to take this into account or not. If the public’s stated preferences do not reflect the effects of time perception then should we artificially weight their preferences to do so? The issue seems analogous to that of adaptation (to which time perceptions would no doubt be subject!). Public valuations of the effects of time perceptions could be captured with the usual time trade-off, standard gamble or discrete choice experiment techniques. One difficulty would be in ensuring that there is no double-counting. It seems likely that this would not apply in the specific applications, where the general public’s valuations would not consider ADHD’s effects on time perception, for example. However, it seems possible (likely, even) that the general public would consider time perception effects associated with being generally unwell.

Perceptions of time have been discussed in economic and health economic literature in respect to experienced utility and biases of memory in retrospective valuations. There has been little contribution to theories about individuals’ present time perception. I believe it may be time for these ideas to be explored further, particularly in relation to specific health conditions, and applied to preferences and expected utility in health.

How do you see time perceptions influencing quality of life? To what extent do you think differences in time perception either could or should influence health care decision making? Please comment below.

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Paying for organs

We have recently seen the idea of buying/selling/trading organs thrust into the media spotlight (and not for the first time). There’s a lot of very poor thinking floating around in this debate, though Sue Rabbitt Roff’s recent paper, which helped fuel the flames of the new debate, is a little more useful.

A market for organs?

There are many reasons why Sue Rabbitt Roff does not propose this, and why Iran is the only country that has adopted one. Ethically the practice is, at best, dubious. At worst it is massively exploitative. Without enough regulation and administration to render it pointless, a market would be hugely inequitable and contradictory to most Western government policy; it would redistribute health from the poor to the rich. However, as heartless machines of rationality, economists tend to be more interested in what is the most efficient policy to adopt. Economists (such as Becker and Elias) have been weighing-in on this issue for a while. In their enjoyable free-marketeer rantings on the topic, the folks at Freakonomics seemingly raised ‘repugnance’ as the only argument against a market for organs. But hopefully readers of this blog are a little more informed when it comes to health economics and realise that a market for organs, like any free market healthcare system, will be massively inefficient. Market-failures (both the “this market doesn’t look how we want it to look” kind, as well as actual market failure) would abound. While the rich’s willingness to pay for organs would far exceed that of the poor, most of us would accept that their capacity to benefit from organ donation would be the same (or lower) than that of the poor. Because the rich assign a higher monetary value to their health it would be possible for there to be a net loss of health from the purchase of an organ. In a free market system organs would, presumably, go to those who can afford them (the rich), rather than those who stand to gain the most from receiving them (the sick). And we all know that the richest are rarely the sickest. To me, none of this sounds very efficient.

Another way?

In the UK the idea of a free market for health care is repugnant enough; thankfully there is little chance of a market for organs developing. However, Sue Rabbitt Roff’s paper does not suggest this. This BMJ article doesn’t really say much and is quite limited. Economists should be chomping at the bit with claims like:

“…if the standard payment [for a kidney] were equivalent to the average annual income in the UK, currently about £28000, it would be an incentive across most income levels for those who wanted to do a kind deed and make enough money to, for instance, pay off university loans.”

Rubbish. But that doesn’t matter. Her general idea – a heavily-regulated system of organ purchase by the NHS -is a feasible one. Let’s remember that here we are talking about anonymous donors and recipients – family and friend donations could remain as they are. To be equitable there could be a fixed payment from the NHS to a donor. The level of this payment should be equal to (society’s valuation of) the health gain enjoyed by the individual receiving the transplant. In a world of value-based pricing this would be the norm! A second requirement would be that the price should be greater than or equal to the loss of health-related quality of life (plus other associated costs) to the donor. This would mean that a donation could be prevented if deemed exploitative, even if against the wishes of the donor. Such a system could nicely boost the supply of organs to existing (need-based) waiting lists.

This will probably be piloted in Scotland: the land of new ideas. For me a system would have to be so heavily regulated that there would not be much point. Politicians, clinicians and academics would love a quick-fix for the problem of organ shortages, but they’ll just have to work a bit harder. People can be encouraged to donate organs in other ways; a switch from opt-in to opt-out posthumous donation being an excellent start.

What do you think? Could the sale and purchase of organs be efficient and equitable? What safeguards would need to be in place if a system was introduced?

 
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Posted by on September 3, 2011 in Markets in Health Care

 

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Falling on deaf ears: The government’s disregard for empirical evidence

What’s the point in research if nobody is listening?

Below is a 3-day time-line of events in the UK that demonstrate hypocrisy, ignorance and a disregard of empirical evidence within the UK Government.

07/03/2011: The Government demonstrates its commitment to translational research. Since the previous government there has been a push for partnerships between universities and the NHS, in order to ensure that research can inform health care and policy.

08/03/2011: A paper is published in Economic Affairs entitled “Tobacco Display Bans: A Global Failure”.

09/03/2011: The Government announces that it will be banning tobacco displays.

There are two possibilities here: a) the government does not know about the research, or b) it does not care. However, both possibilities lead to the same conclusion; that the government does not base policy decisions on empirical evidence. This might not come as a surprise; a recent article demonstrates that proposed NHS reforms are not evidence-led either. The Government also ignored evidence of the success of hospital targets in England, causing a 60% rise in hospital test delays in the space of a year.

So what does this mean to us, researchers and academics in health economics? Does it mean that we have no hope of influencing policy? Do we need to find new channels of dissemination?

 
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Posted by on March 11, 2011 in News

 

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