Simon McNamara’s journal round-up for 1st October 2018

Every Monday our authors provide a round-up of some of the most recently published peer reviewed articles from the field. We don’t cover everything, or even what’s most important – just a few papers that have interested the author. Visit our Resources page for links to more journals or follow the HealthEconBot. If you’d like to write one of our weekly journal round-ups, get in touch.

A review of NICE appraisals of pharmaceuticals 2000-2016 found variation in establishing comparative clinical effectiveness. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology [PubMed] Published 17th September 2018

The first paper in this week’s round-up is on the topic on single arm studies; specifically, the way in which the comparative effectiveness of medicines granted a marketing authorisation on the basis of single arm studies have been evaluated in NICE appraisals. If you are interested in comparative effectiveness, single arm studies are difficult to deal with. If you don’t have a control arm to refer to, how do you know what the impact of the intervention is? If you don’t know how effective the intervention is, how can you say whether it is cost-effective?

In this paper, the authors conduct a review into the way this problem has been dealt with during NICE appraisals. They do this by searching through the 489 NICE technology appraisals conducted between 2010 and 2016. The search identified 22 relevant appraisals (4% of the total). The most commonly used way of estimating comparative effectiveness (19 of 22 appraisals) was simulation of a control arm using external data – be that from observational study or a randomised trial. Of these,14 of the appraisals featured naïve comparison across studies, with no attempt made to adjust for potential differences between population groups. The three appraisals that didn’t use external data were reliant upon the use of expert opinion, or the assumption that non-responders in the intervention single-arm study could be used as a proxy for those who would receive the comparator intervention.

Interestingly, the authors find little difference between the proportion of medicines reliant on non-RCT data being approved by NICE (83%), compared to those with RCT data (86%), however; the likelihood of receiving an “optimised” (aka subgroup) approval was substantially higher for medicines with solely non-RCT data (41% vs 19%). These findings demonstrate that NICE do accept models based on single-arm studies – even if more than 75% of the comparative effectiveness estimates these models were based on were reliant upon naïve indirect comparisons, or other less robust methods.

The paper concludes by noting that single-arm studies are becoming more common (50% of the appraisals identified were conducted in 2015-2016), and suggesting that HTA and regulatory bodies should work together, to develop guidance on how to evaluate comparative effectiveness based on single-arm studies.

I thought this paper was great, and it made me reflect on a couple of things. Firstly, the fact that NICE completed such a high volume of appraisals (489) between 2010 and 2016 is extremely impressive – well done NICE. Secondly, should the EMA, or EUnetHTA, play a larger role in providing estimates of comparative effectiveness for single arm studies? Whilst different countries may reasonably make different value judgements about different health outcomes, comparative effectiveness is – at least in theory – a matter of fact, rather than values, so can’t we assess it centrally?

A QALY loss is a QALY loss is a QALY loss: a note on independence of loss aversion from health states. The European Journal of Health Economics [PubMed] Published 18th September 2018

If I told you that you would receive £10 in return for doing some work for me, and then I only paid you £5, how annoyed would you be? What about if I told you I would give you £10 but then gave you £15? How delighted would you be? If you are economically rational then these two impacts (annoyance vs being delighted) should be symmetrical; but, if you are a human, your annoyance in the first scenario would likely outweigh the delight you would experience in the second. This is the basic idea behind Kahneman and Tversky’s seminal work on “loss aversion” – we dislike changes we perceive as losses more than we like equivalent changes we perceive as gains. The second paper in this week’s roundup explores loss aversion in the context of health. Application of loss aversion in health is a really interesting idea, because it calls into question the idea that people value all QALYs equally – perhaps QALYs perceived as losses are valued more highly than QALYs perceived as gains.

In the introduction of this paper, the authors note that existing evidence suggests loss aversion is present for duration of life, and for quality of life, but note that nobody has explored whether loss aversion remains constant if the two elements change together – simply put, when it comes to loss aversion is “a QALY loss a QALY loss a QALY loss”? The authors test this idea via a choice experiment fielded in a sample of 111 Dutch students. In this experiment, the loss aversion of each participant was independently elicited for four EQ-5D-5L health states – ranging from perfect health down to a health state utility value of 0.46.

As you might have guessed from the title of the paper, the authors found that, at the aggregate level, loss aversion was not significantly different between the four health states – albeit with some variation at the individual level. For each health state, perceived losses were weighted around two times as highly as perceived gains.

I enjoyed this paper, and it prompted me to think about the consequences of loss-aversion for health economics more generally. Do health related decision makers treat the outcomes associated with a new technology as a reference-point, and so feel loss aversion when considering not funding it? From a normative perspective, should we accept asymmetry in the valuation of health? Is this simply a behavioural quirk that we should over-ride in our analyses, or should we be conforming to it and granting differential weight to outcomes depending upon whether the recipient perceives it as a gain or a loss?

Advanced therapy medicinal products and health technology assessment principles and practices for value-based and sustainable healthcare. The European Journal of Health Economics [PubMed] Published 18th September 2018

The final paper in this week’s roundup is on “Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products” (ATMPs). According to the European Union Regulation 1394/2007, an ATMP is a medicine which is either (1) a gene therapy, (2) a somatic-cell therapy, (3) a tissue-engineered therapy, or (4) a combination of these approaches. I don’t pretend to understand the nuances of how these medicines work, but in simple terms ATMPs aim to replace, or regenerate, human cells, tissues and organs in order to treat ill health. Whilst ATMPs are thought to have great potential in improving health and providing long-term survival gains, they present a number of challenges for Health Technology Assessment (HTA) bodies.

This paper details a meeting of a panel of experts from the UK, Germany, France and Sweden, who were tasked with identifying and discussing these challenges. The experts identified three key challenges; (1) uncertainty of long-term benefit, and subsequently cost-effectiveness, (2) discount rates, and (3) capturing the broader “value” of these therapies – including the incremental value associated with potentially curative therapies. These three challenges stem from the fact that at the point of HTA, ATMPs are likely to have immature data and the uncertain prospect of long-term benefits. The experts suggest a range of solutions to these problems, including the use of outcomes-based reimbursement schemes, initiating a multi-disciplinary forum to consider different approaches to discounting, and further research into elements of “value” not captured by current HTA processes.

Whilst there is undoubtedly merit to some of these suggestions, I couldn’t help but feel a bit uneasy about this paper due to its funder – an ATMP manufacturer. Would the authors have written this paper if they hadn’t been paid to by a company with a vested interest in changing HTA systems to suit their agenda? Whilst I don’t doubt the paper was written independently of the company, and don’t mean to cast aspersions on the authors, this does make me question how industry shapes the areas of discourse in our field – even if it doesn’t shape the specific details of that discourse.

Many of the problems raised in this paper are not unique to ATMPs, they apply equally to all interventions with the uncertain prospect of potential cure or long-term benefit (e.g. for therapies for the treatment of early stage cancer, public health interventions or immunotherapies). Science aside, funder aside, what makes ATMPs any different to these prior interventions?

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Simon McNamara’s journal round-up for 6th August 2018

Every Monday our authors provide a round-up of some of the most recently published peer reviewed articles from the field. We don’t cover everything, or even what’s most important – just a few papers that have interested the author. Visit our Resources page for links to more journals or follow the HealthEconBot. If you’d like to write one of our weekly journal round-ups, get in touch.

Euthanasia, religiosity and the valuation of health states: results from an Irish EQ5D5L valuation study and their implications for anchor values. Health and Quality of Life Outcomes [PubMed] Published 31st July 2018

Do you support euthanasia? Do you think there are health states worse than death? Are you religious? Don’t worry – I am not commandeering this week’s AHE journal round-up just to bombard you with a series of difficult questions. These three questions form the foundation of the first article selected for this week’s round-up.

The paper is based upon the hypothesis that your religiosity (“adherence to religious beliefs”) is likely to impact your support for euthanasia and, subsequently, the likelihood of you valuing severe health states as worse than death. This seems like a logical hypothesis. Religions tend to be anti-euthanasia, and so it appears likely that religious people will have lower levels of support for euthanasia than non-religious people. Equally, if you don’t support the principle of euthanasia, it stands to reason that you are likely to be less willing to choose immediate death over living in a severe health state – something you would need to do for a health state to be considered as being worse than death in a time trade-off (TTO) study.

The authors test this hypothesis using a sub-sample of data (n=160) collected as part of the Irish EQ-5D-5L TTO valuation study. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the authors find evidence in support of the above hypotheses. Those that attend a religious service weekly were more likely to oppose euthanasia than those who attend a few times a year or less, and those who oppose euthanasia were less likely to give “worse than death” responses in the TTO than those that support it.

I found this paper really interesting, as it raises a number of challenging questions. If a society is made up of people with heterogeneous beliefs regarding religion, how should we balance these in the valuation of health? If a society is primarily non-religious is it fair to apply this valuation tariff to the lives of the religious, and vice versa? These certainly aren’t easy questions to answer, but may be worth reflecting on.

E-learning and health inequality aversion: A questionnaire experiment. Health Economics [PubMed] [RePEc] Published 22nd July 2018

Moving on from the cheery topic of euthanasia, what do you think about socioeconomic inequalities in health? In my home country, England, if you are from the poorest quintile of society, you can expect to experience 62 years in full health in your lifetime, whilst if you are from the richest quintile, you can expect to experience 74 years – a gap of 12 years.

In the second paper to be featured in this round-up, Cookson et al. explore the public’s willingness to sacrifice incremental population health gains in order to reduce these inequalities in health – their level of “health inequality aversion”. This is a potentially important area of research, as the vast majority of economic evaluation in health is distributionally-naïve and effectively assumes that members of the public aren’t at all concerned with inequalities in health.

The paper builds on prior work conducted by the authors in this area, in which they noted a high proportion of respondents in health inequality aversion elicitation studies appear to be so averse to inequalities that they violate monotonicity – they choose scenarios that reduce inequalities in health even if these scenarios reduce the health of the rich at no gain to the poor, or they reduce the health of the poor, or they may reduce the health of both groups. The authors hypothesise that these monotonicity violations may be due to incomplete thinking from participants, and suggest that the quality of their thinking could be improved by two e-learning educational interventions. The primary aim of the paper is to test the impact of these interventions in a sample of the UK public (n=60).

The first e-learning intervention was an animated video that described a range of potential positions that a respondent could take (e.g. health maximisation, or maximising the health of the worst off). The second was an interactive spreadsheet-based questionnaire that presented the consequences of the participant’s choices, prior to them confirming their selection. Both interventions are available online.

The authors found that the interactive tool significantly reduced the amount of extreme egalitarian (monotonicity-violating) responses, compared to a non-interactive, paper-based version of the study. Similarly, when the video was watched before completing the paper-based exercise, the number of extreme egalitarian responses reduced. However, when the video was watched before the interactive tool there was no further decrease in extreme egalitarianism. Despite this reduction in extreme egalitarianism, the median levels of inequality aversion remained high, with implied weights of 2.6 and 7.0 for QALY gains granted to someone from the poorest fifth of society, compared to the richest fifth of society for the interactive questionnaire and video groups respectively.

This is an interesting study that provides further evidence of inequality aversion, and raises further concern about the practical dominance of distributionally-naïve approaches to economic evaluation. The public does seem to care about distribution. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that participant responses to inequality aversion exercises are shaped by the information given to them, and the way that information is presented. I look forward to seeing more studies like this in the future.

A new method for valuing health: directly eliciting personal utility functions. The European Journal of Health Economics [PubMed] [RePEc] Published 20th July 2018

Last, but not least, for this round-up, is a paper by Devlin et al. on a new method for valuing health.

The relative valuation of health states is a pretty important topic for health economists. If we are to quantify the effectiveness, and subsequently cost-effectiveness, of an intervention, we need to understand which health states are better than others, and how much better they are. Traditionally, this is done by asking members of the public to choose between different health profiles featuring differing levels of fulfilment of a range of domains of health, in order to ‘uncover’ the relative importance the respondent places on these domains, and levels. These can then be used in order to generate social tariffs that assign a utility value to a given health state for use in economic evaluation.

The authors point out that, in the modern day, valuation studies can be conducted rapidly, and at scale, online, but at the potential cost of deliberation from participants, and the resultant risk of heuristic dominated decision making. In response to this, the authors propose a new method – direct elicitation of personal utility functions, and pilot its use for the valuation of EQ-5D in a sample of the English public (n=76).

The proposed approach differs from traditional approaches in three key ways. Firstly, instead of simply attempting to infer the relative importance that participants place on differing domains based upon choices between health profiles, the respondents are asked directly about the relative importance they place on differing domains of health, prior to validating these with profile choices. Secondly, the authors place a heavy emphasis on deliberation, and the construction, rather than uncovering, of preferences during the elicitation exercises. Thirdly, a “personal utility function” for each individual is constructed (in effect a personal EQ-5D tariff), and these individual utility functions are subsequently aggregated into a social utility function.

In the pilot, the authors find that the method appears feasible for wider use, albeit with some teething troubles associated with the computer-based tool developed to implement it, and the skills of the interviewers.

This direct method raises an interesting question for health economics – should we be inferring preferences based upon choices that differ in terms of certain attributes, or should we just ask directly about the attributes? This is a tricky question. It is possible that the preferences elicited via these different approaches could result in different preferences – if they do, on what grounds should we choose one or other? This requires a normative judgment, and at present, it appears both are (potentially) as legitimate as each other.

Whilst the authors apply this direct method to the valuation of health, I don’t see why similar approaches couldn’t be applied to any multi-attribute choice experiment. Keep your eyes out for future uses of it in valuation, and perhaps beyond? It will be interesting to see how it develops.

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