Demand for insurance (including long-term care, supple- mentary insurance); supply of insurance services; moral hazard, its control and trade-offs with risk-pooling; adverse selection and cream skimming; tax-financed health care sys- tems; tax policy, exemptions, personal subsidies and health care financing; private and public systems of health insur- ance; welfare effects of ‘excess’ insurance and the trade-off
with internalizing externalities; insurance effects on health care providers; issues in coverage: services covered, individual eligibility.
Adverse selection, a process whereby low-risk individuals drop out of the insurance pool, leaving only high-risk individuals, arises when the individuals purchasing insurance have better information regarding their risk status than does the insurer. […]… Read More »Why insurance works better with some adverse selection
“Doing the math” on the distribution of healthcare expenditures: a Pareto-like distribution is inevitable
Yesterday I explored one of the major challenges to affordable, universal health insurance, namely the high cost of providing care to the sickest patients. The extreme distribution of healthcare costs means that “Targeting the highest… Read More »“Doing the math” on the distribution of healthcare expenditures: a Pareto-like distribution is inevitable
One of the major challenges to affordable, universal health insurance is the high cost of providing care to the sickest patients. According to Roy Vaughn, senior vice president at BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, “just 5… Read More »Sharing the burden of healthcare: providing care to our sickest patients