Essen Economics of Mental Health Workshop

The third Essen Economics of Mental Health Workshop will take place on August 3 – 4, 2020 in Essen, Germany.

Half of those with a lifetime mental health problem first experience symptoms by the age of 14, and 75% before they reach their mid-twenties (Kessler et al., 2007). The conditions are often persistent and recurrent meaning they influence the entire work-life of the affected individuals (OECD, 2012).

This workshop aims to gather (junior) researchers with an interest in applying the tools of economics to problems surrounding mental health. This includes, but is not limited to, mental health economics studies looking at informal care, loneliness, social exclusion, access to health care, insurance coverage, declines in physical health, age of onset, dementia, suicide, etc. Empirical analyses in this field are especially encouraged for Submission.

Ezra Golberstein (University of Minnesota) and Martin Knapp (London School of Economics and Political Science) will deliver the keynotes for this workshop.

For further details, please see the Flyer (you may also use this for further distribution) or consult the application page.

Chris Sampson’s journal round-up for 23rd December 2019

Every Monday our authors provide a round-up of some of the most recently published peer reviewed articles from the field. We don’t cover everything, or even what’s most important – just a few papers that have interested the author. Visit our Resources page for links to more journals or follow the HealthEconBot. If you’d like to write one of our weekly journal round-ups, get in touch.

The Internet and children’s psychological wellbeing. Journal of Health Economics Published 13th December 2019

Here at the blog, we like the Internet. We couldn’t exist without it. We vie for your attention along with all of the other content factories (or “friends”). But there’s a well-established sense that people – especially children – should moderate their consumption of Internet content. The Internet is pervasive and is now a fundamental part of our day-to-day lives, not simply an information source to which we turn when we need it. Almost all 12-15 year olds in the UK use the Internet. The ubiquity of the Internet makes it difficult to test its effects. But this paper has a good go at it.

This study is based on the idea that broadband speeds are a good proxy for Internet use. In England, a variety of public and private sector initiatives have resulted in a distorted market with quasi-random assigment of broadband speeds. The authors provide a very thorough explanation of children’s wellbeing in relation to the Internet, outlining a range of potential mechanisms.

The analysis combines data from the UK’s pre-eminent household panel survey (Understanding Society) with broadband speed data published by the UK regulator Ofcom. Six wellbeing outcomes are analysed from children’s self-reported responses. The questions ask children how they feel about their lives – measured on a seven-point scale – in relation to school work, appearance, family, friends, school attended, and life as a whole. An unbalanced panel of 6,310 children from 2012-2017 provides 13,938 observations from 3,765 different Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOA), with average broadband speeds for each LSOA for each year. Each of the six wellbeing outcomes is modelled with child-, neighbourhood- and time-specific fixed effects. The models’ covariates include a variety of indicators relating to the child, their parents, their household, and their local area.

A variety of models are tested, and the overall finding is that higher broadband speeds are negatively associated with all of the six wellbeing indicators. Wellbeing in relation to appearance shows the strongest effect; a 1% increase in broadband speed reduces happiness with appearance by around 0.6%. The authors explore a variety of potential mechanisms by running pairs of models between broadband speeds and the mechanism and between the mechanism and the outcomes. A key finding is that the data seem to support the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis. Higher broadband speeds are associated with children spending less time on activities such as sports, clubs, and real world social interactions, and these activities are in turn positively associated with wellbeing. The authors also consider different subgroups, finding that the effects are more detrimental for girls.

Where the paper falls down is that it doesn’t do anything to convince us that broadband speeds represent a good proxy for Internet use. It’s also not clear exactly what the proxy is meant to be for – use (e.g. time spent on the Internet) or access (i.e. having the option to use the Internet) – though the authors seem to be interested in the former. If that’s the case, the logic of the proxy is not obvious. If I want to do X on the Internet then higher speeds will enable me to do it in less time, in which case the proxy would capture the inverse of the desired indicator. The other problem I think we have is in the use of self-reported measures in this context. A key supposed mechanism for the effect is through ‘social comparison theory’, which we might reasonably expect to influence the way children respond to questions as well as – or instead of – their underlying wellbeing.

One-way sensitivity analysis for probabilistic cost-effectiveness analysis: conditional expected incremental net benefit. PharmacoEconomics [PubMed] Published 16th December 2019

Here we have one of those very citable papers that clearly specifies a part of cost-effectiveness analysis methodology. A better title for this paper could be Make one-way sensitivity analysis great again. The authors start out by – quite rightly – bashing the tornado diagram, mostly on the basis that it does not intuitively characterise the information that a decision-maker needs. Instead, the authors propose an approach to probabilistic one-way sensitivity analysis (POSA) that is a kind of simplified version of EVPPI (expected value of partially perfect information) analysis. Crucially, this approach does not assume that the various parameters of the analysis are independent.

The key quantity created by this analysis is the conditional expected incremental net monetary benefit (cINMB), conditional, that is, on the value of the parameter of interest. There are three steps to creating a plot of the POSA results: 1) rank the costs and outcomes for the sampled values of the parameter – say from the first to the last centile; 2) plug in a cost-effectiveness threshold value to calculate the cINMB at each sampled value; and 3) record the probability of observing each value of the parameter. You could use this information to present a tornado-style diagram, plotting the credible range of the cINMB. But it’s more useful to plot a line graph showing the cINMB at the different values of the parameter of interest, taking into account the probability that the values will actually be observed.

The authors illustrate their method using three different parameters from a previously published cost-effectiveness analysis, in each case simulating 15,000 Monte Carlo ‘inner loops’ for each of the 99 centiles. It took me a little while to get my head around the results that are presented, so there’s still some work to do around explaining the visuals to decision-makers. Nevertheless, this approach has the potential to become standard practice.

A head-on ordinal comparison of the composite time trade-off and the better-than-dead method. Value in Health Published 19th December 2019

For years now, methodologists have been trying to find a reliable way to value health states ‘worse than dead’. The EQ-VT protocol, used to value the EQ-5D-5L, includes the composite time trade-off (cTTO). The cTTO task gives people the opportunity to trade away life years in good health to avoid having to subsequently live in a state that they have identified as being ‘worse than dead’ (i.e. they would prefer to die immediately than to live in it). An alternative approach to this is the better-than-dead method, whereby people simply compare given durations in a health state to being dead. But are these two approaches measuring the same thing? This study sought to find out.

The authors recruited a convenience sample of 200 students and asked them to value seven different EQ-5D-5L health states that were close to zero in the Dutch tariff. Each respondent completed both a cTTO task and a better-than-dead task (the order varied) for each of the seven states. The analysis then looked at the extent to which there was agreement between the two methods in terms of whether states were identified as being better or worse than dead. Agreement was measured using counts and using polychoric correlations. Unsurprisingly, agreement was higher for those states that lay further from zero in the Dutch tariff. Around zero, there was quite a bit of disagreement – only 65% agreed for state 44343. Both approaches performed similarly with respect to consistency and test-retest reliability. Overall, the authors interpret these findings as meaning that the two methods are measuring the same underlying preferences.

I don’t find that very convincing. States were more often identified as worse than dead in the better-than-dead task, with 55% valued as such, compared with 37% in the cTTO. That seems like a big difference. The authors provide a variety of possible explanations for the differences, mostly relating to the way the tasks are framed. Or it might be that the complexity of the worse-than-dead task in the cTTO is so confusing and counterintuitive that respondents (intentionally or otherwise) avoid having to do it. For me, the findings reinforce the futility of trying to value health states in relation to being dead. If a slight change in methodology prevents a group of biomedical students from giving consistent assessments of whether or not a state is worse than being dead, what hope do we have?

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Chris Sampson’s journal round-up for 18th November 2019

Every Monday our authors provide a round-up of some of the most recently published peer reviewed articles from the field. We don’t cover everything, or even what’s most important – just a few papers that have interested the author. Visit our Resources page for links to more journals or follow the HealthEconBot. If you’d like to write one of our weekly journal round-ups, get in touch.

A conceptual map of health-related quality of life dimensions: key lessons for a new instrument. Quality of Life Research [PubMed] Published 1st November 2019

EQ-5D, SF-6D, HUI3, AQoL, 15D; they’re all used to describe health states for the purpose of estimating health state utility values, to get the ‘Q’ in the QALY. But it’s widely recognised (and evidenced) that they measure different things. This study sought to better understand the challenge by doing two things: i) ‘mapping’ the domains of the different instruments and ii) advising on the domains to be included in a new measure.

The conceptual model described in this paper builds on two standard models of health – the ICF (International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health), which is endorsed by the WHO, and the Wilson and Cleary model. The new model is built around four distinctions, which can be used to define the dimensions included in health state utility instruments: cause vs effect, specific vs broad, physical vs psychological, and subjective vs objective. The idea is that each possible dimension of health can relate, with varying levels of precision, to one or the other of these alternatives.

The authors argue that, conveniently, cause/effect and specific/broad map to one another, as do physical/psychological and objective/subjective. The framework is presented visually, which makes it easy to interpret – I recommend you take a look. Each of the five instruments previously mentioned is mapped to the framework, with the HUI and 15D coming out as ‘symptom’ oriented, EQ-5D and SF-6D as ‘functioning’ oriented, and the AQoL as a hybrid of a health and well-being instrument. Based (it seems) on the Personal Wellbeing Index, the authors also include two social dimensions in the framework, which interact with the health domains. Based on the frequency with which dimensions are included in existing instruments, the authors recommend that a new measure should include three physical dimensions (mobility, self-care, pain), three mental health dimensions (depression, vitality, sleep), and two social domains (personal relationships, social isolation).

This framework makes no sense to me. The main problem is that none of the four distinctions hold water, let alone stand up to being mapped linearly to one another. Take pain as an example. It could be measured subjectively or objectively. It’s usually considered a physical matter, but psychological pain is no less meaningful. It may be a ‘causal’ symptom, but there is little doubt that it matters in and of itself as an ‘effect’. The authors themselves even offer up a series of examples of where the distinctions fall down.

It would be nice if this stuff could be drawn-up on a two-dimensional plane, but it isn’t that simple. In addition to oversimplifying complex ideas, I don’t think the authors have fully recognised the level of complexity. For instance, the work seems to be inspired – at least in part – by a desire to describe health state utility instruments in relation to subjective well-being (SWB). But the distinction between health state utility instruments and SWB isn’t simply a matter of scope. Health state utility instruments (as we use them) are about valuing states in relation to preferences, whereas SWB is about experienced utility. That’s a far more important and meaningful distinction than the distinction between symptoms and functioning.

Careless costs related to inefficient technology used within NHS England. Clinical Medicine Journal [PubMed] Published 8th November 2019

This little paper – barely even a single page – was doing the rounds on Twitter. The author was inspired by some frustration in his day job, waiting for the IT to work. We can all relate to that. This brief analysis sums the potential costs of what the author calls ‘careless costs’, which is vaguely defined as time spent by an NHS employee on activity that does not relate to patient care. Supposing that all doctors in the English NHS wasted an average of 10 minutes per day on such activities, it would cost over £143 million (per year, I assume) based on current salaries. The implication is that a little bit of investment could result in massive savings.

This really bugs me, for at least two reasons. First, it is normal for anybody in any profession to have a bit of downtime. Nobody operates at maximum productivity for every minute of every day. If the doctor didn’t have their downtime waiting for a PC to boot, it would be spent queuing in Costa, or having a nice relaxed wee. Probably both. Those 10 minutes that are displaced cannot be considered equivalent in value to 10 minutes of patient contact time. The second reason is that there is no intervention that can fix this problem at little or no cost. Investments cost money. And if perfect IT systems existed, we wouldn’t all find these ‘careless costs’ so familiar. No doubt, the NHS lags behind, but the potential savings of improvement may very well be closer to zero than to the estimates in this paper.

When it comes to clinical impacts, people insist on being able to identify causal improvements from clearly defined interventions or changes. But when it comes to costs, too many people are confident in throwing around huge numbers of speculative origin.

Socioeconomic disparities in unmet need for student mental health services in higher education. Applied Health Economics and Health Policy [PubMed] Published 5th November 2019

In many countries, the size of the student population is growing, and this population seems to have a high level of need for mental health services. There are a variety of challenges in this context that make it an interesting subject for health economists to study (which is why I do), including the fact that universities are often the main providers of services. If universities are going to provide the right services and reach the right people, a better understanding of who needs what is required. This study contributes to this challenge.

The study is set in the context of higher education in Ireland. If you have no idea how higher education is organised in Ireland, and have an interest in mental health, then the Institutional Context section of this paper is worth reading in its own right. The study reports on findings from a national survey of students. This analysis is a secondary analysis of data collected for the primary purpose of eliciting students’ preferences for counselling services, which has been described elsewhere. In this paper, the authors report on supplementary questions, including measures of psychological distress and use of mental health services. Responses from 5,031 individuals, broadly representative of the population, were analysed.

Around 23% of respondents were classified as having unmet need for mental health services based on them reporting both a) severe distress and b) not using services. Arguably, it’s a sketchy definition of unmet need, but it seems reasonable for the purpose of this analysis. The authors regress this binary indicator of unmet need on a selection of sociodemographic and individual characteristics. The model is also run for the binary indicator of need only (rather than unmet need).

The main finding is that people from lower social classes are more likely to have unmet need, but that this is only because these people have a higher level of need. That is, people from less well-off backgrounds are more likely to have mental health problems but are no less likely to have their need met. So this is partly good news and partly bad news. It seems that there are no additional barriers to services in Ireland for students from a lower social class. But unmet need is still high and – with more inclusive university admissions – likely to grow. Based on the analyses, the authors recommend that universities could reach out to male students, who have greater unmet need.

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