Chris Sampson’s journal round-up for 8th January 2018

Every Monday our authors provide a round-up of some of the most recently published peer reviewed articles from the field. We don’t cover everything, or even what’s most important – just a few papers that have interested the author. Visit our Resources page for links to more journals or follow the HealthEconBot. If you’d like to write one of our weekly journal round-ups, get in touch.

An empirical comparison of the measurement properties of the EQ-5D-5L, DEMQOL-U and DEMQOL-Proxy-U for older people in residential care. Quality of Life Research [PubMed] Published 5th January 2018

There is now a condition-specific preference-based measure of health-related quality of life that can be used for people with cognitive impairment: the DEMQOL-U. Beyond the challenge of appropriately defining quality of life in this context, cognitive impairment presents the additional difficulty that individuals may not be able to self-complete a questionnaire. There’s some good evidence that proxy responses can be valid and reliable for people with cognitive impairment. The purpose of this study is to try out the new(ish) EQ-5D-5L in the context of cognitive impairment in a residential setting. Data were taken from an observational study in 17 residential care facilities in Australia. A variety of outcome measures were collected including the EQ-5D-5L (proxy where necessary), a cognitive bolt-on item for the EQ-5D, the DEMQOL-U and the DEMQOL-Proxy-U (from a family member or friend), the Modified Barthel Index, the cognitive impairment Psychogeriatric Assessment Scale (PAS-Cog), and the neuropsychiatric inventory questionnaire (NPI-Q). The researchers tested the correlation, convergent validity, and known-group validity for the various measures. 143 participants self-completed the EQ-5D-5L and DEMQOL-U, while 387 responses were available for the proxy versions. People with a diagnosis of dementia reported higher utility values on the EQ-5D-5L and DEMQOL-U than people without a diagnosis. Correlations between the measures were weak to moderate. Some people reported full health on the EQ-5D-5L despite identifying some impairment on the DEMQOL-U, and some vice versa. The EQ-5D-5L was more strongly correlated with clinical outcome measures than were the DEMQOL-U or DEMQOL-Proxy-U, though the associations were generally weak. The relationship between cognitive impairment and self-completed EQ-5D-5L and DEMQOL-U utilities was not in the expected direction; people with greater cognitive impairment reported higher utility values. There was quite a lot of disagreement between utility values derived from the different measures, so the EQ-5D-5L and DEMQOL-U should not be seen as substitutes. An EQ-QALY is not a DEM-QALY. This is all quite perplexing when it comes to measuring health-related quality of life in people with cognitive impairment. What does it mean if a condition-specific measure does not correlate with the condition? It could be that for people with cognitive impairment the key determinant of their quality of life is only indirectly related to their impairment, and more dependent on their living conditions.

Resolving the “cost-effective but unaffordable” paradox: estimating the health opportunity costs of nonmarginal budget impacts. Value in Health Published 4th January 2018

Back in 2015 (as discussed on this blog), NICE started appraising drugs that were cost-effective but implied such high costs for the NHS that they seemed unaffordable. This forced a consideration of how budget impact should be handled in technology appraisal. But the matter is far from settled and different countries have adopted different approaches. The challenge is to accurately estimate the opportunity cost of an investment, which will depend on the budget impact. A fixed cost-effectiveness threshold isn’t much use. This study builds on York’s earlier work that estimated cost-effectiveness thresholds based on health opportunity costs in the NHS. The researchers attempt to identify cost-effectiveness thresholds that are in accordance with different non-marginal (i.e. large) budget impacts. The idea is that a larger budget impact should imply a lower (i.e. more difficult to satisfy) cost-effectiveness threshold. NHS expenditure data were combined with mortality rates for different disease categories by geographical area. When primary care trusts’ (PCTs) budget allocations change, they transition gradually. This means that – for a period of time – some trusts receive a larger budget than they are expected to need while others receive a smaller budget. The researchers identify these as over-target and under-target accordingly. The expenditure and outcome elasticities associated with changes in the budget are estimated for the different disease groups (defined by programme budgeting categories; PBCs). Expenditure elasticity refers to the change in PBC expenditure given a change in overall NHS expenditure. Outcome elasticity refers to the change in PBC mortality given a change in PBC expenditure. Two econometric approaches are used; an interaction term approach, whereby a subgroup interaction term is used with the expenditure and outcome variables, and a subsample estimation approach, whereby subgroups are analysed separately. Despite the limitations associated with a reduced sample size, the subsample estimation approach is preferred on theoretical grounds. Using this method, under-target PCTs face a cost-per-QALY of £12,047 and over-target PCTs face a cost-per-QALY of £13,464, reflecting diminishing marginal returns. The estimates are used as the basis for identifying a health production function that can approximate the association between budget changes and health opportunity costs. Going back to the motivating example of hepatitis C drugs, a £772 million budget impact would ‘cost’ 61,997 QALYs, rather than the 59,667 that we would expect without accounting for the budget impact. This means that the threshold should be lower (at £12,452 instead of £12,936) for a budget impact of this size. The authors discuss a variety of approaches for ‘smoothing’ the budget impact of such investments. Whether or not you believe the absolute size of the quoted numbers depends on whether you believe the stack of (necessary) assumptions used to reach them. But regardless of that, the authors present an interesting and novel approach to establishing an empirical basis for estimating health opportunity costs when budget impacts are large.

First do no harm – the impact of financial incentives on dental x-rays. Journal of Health Economics [RePEc] Published 30th December 2017

If dentists move from fee-for-service to a salary, or if patients move from co-payment to full exemption, does it influence the frequency of x-rays? That’s the question that the researchers are trying to answer in this study. It’s important because x-rays always present some level of (carcinogenic) risk to patients and should therefore only be used when the benefits are expected to exceed the harms. Financial incentives shouldn’t come into it. If they do, then some dentists aren’t playing by the rules. And that seems to be the case. The authors start out by establishing a theoretical framework for the interaction between patient and dentist, which incorporates the harmful nature of x-rays, dentist remuneration, the patient’s payment arrangements, and the characteristics of each party. This model is used in conjunction with data from NHS Scotland, with 1.3 million treatment claims from 200,000 patients and 3,000 dentists. In 19% of treatments, an x-ray occurs. Some dentists are salaried and some are not, while some people pay charges for treatment and some are exempt. A series of fixed effects models are used to take advantage of these differences in arrangements by modelling the extent to which switches (between arrangements, for patients or dentists) influence the probability of receiving an x-ray. The authors’ preferred model shows that both the dentist’s remuneration arrangement and the patient’s financial status influences the number of x-rays in the direction predicted by the model. That is, fee-for-service and charge exemption results in more x-rays. The combination of these two factors results in a 9.4 percentage point increase in the probability of an x-ray during treatment, relative to salaried dentists with non-exempt patients. While the results do show that financial incentives influence this treatment decision (when they shouldn’t), the authors aren’t able to link the behaviour to patient harm. So we don’t know what percentage of treatments involving x-rays would correspond to the decision rule of benefits exceeding harms. Nevertheless, this is an important piece of work for informing the definition of dentist reimbursement and patient payment mechanisms.

Credits

ICU triage: a challenge and an opportunity

In a well-publicized snapshot of the challenge of ICU triage, Chang and colleagues wrote:

Critical care services can be life-saving, but many patients admitted to intensive care units (ICUs) are too sick or, conversely, not sick enough to benefit. Intensive care unit overutilization can produce more costly and invasive care without improving outcomes.

Emphasis added. Hyder provides an interesting critique to which Chang and Shapiro respond. In this post, I shall consider over-utilization by those “not sick enough to benefit”: 23.4% of the 808 patients admitted to the UCLA Medical Center in the study by Chang et al. This over-utilization provides both a challenge and a win-win opportunity (better outcomes at lower cost) if we can meet the challenge.

In a forward-looking vision, which some may regard as optimistic, Anesi et al wrote:

In the year 2050 we will unambiguously reimburse healthcare based on value, and so there is good reason to suspect that we will have targeted and reduced many services that provide little or no benefit to patients…

It can be argued that ICU over-utilization, on average, provides no overall benefit, while significantly increasing costs. Gooch and Kahn observed that US spending on critical care represents nearly 3% of GDP, while:

In contrast, the United Kingdom spends only 0.1% of its gross domestic product on critical care services, with no evidence of worse patient outcomes and similar life expectancies as in the United States. Although there are many differences between these 2 countries, one significant difference is intensive care unit (ICU) bed supply. The United States has 25 ICU beds per 100 000 people, as compared with 5 per 100 000 in the United Kingdom. As a result, ICU case-mix differs substantially. In the United Kingdom, the majority of ICU patients are at high risk for death, whereas in the United States, many patients are admitted to the ICU for observation.

As observed by Halpern, these differences come at a significant cost in the US:

The number of intensive care unit (ICU) beds in the United States has continued to increase over the last 3 decades, as have ICU utilization rates and costs, and this despite the lack of any federal, regional, or critical care society mandates to justify these increases. Some experts believe that the increase in the number of ICU beds has led to inappropriate use of these beds by patients who are either too healthy or too sick to benefit from intensive care. This may in part explain the stable national ICU occupancy rate of approximately 68% between 1985 and 2010 and suggests that ICU utilization has simply risen to meet the increased number of beds.

Emphasis added. I shall consider here only ICU usage by patients too healthy to benefit. Although the economics behind reducing ICU over-utilization by “those not sick enough to benefit” appears simple, the underlying cause is in fact likely complex.

icu-costs-fig-1

This one appears easy: lower costs and potentially better outcomes

At the same time, I recall several caveats, well known to health economists, but important in planning and communication:

  1. We expect ICUs to be available when needed, including for emergencies and disasters,
  2. ICUs have high fixed costs,
  3. Decision-making is critical: incremental costs of adding capacity become fixed costs in the future.

Chris Sampson recently reviewed a study aimed at overconsumption or misconsumption (a consequence of over-utilization). The authors of that paper suggest that “cultural change might be required to achieve significant shifts in clinical behaviour.” Chris laments that this study did not ‘dig deeper’; here we aim to dig deeper in one specific area: ICU triage for patients “not sick enough to benefit.” More questions than answers at this stage, but hopefully the questions will ultimately lead to answers.

I begin by stepping back: economic decisions frequently involve compromises in allocating scarce resources. Decisions in health economics are frequently no different. How scarce are ICU resources? What happens if they are less scarce? What are the costs? Increasing availability can frequently lead to increased utilization, a phenomenon called “demand elasticity”. For example, increasing expressway/motorway capacity “can lead to increased traffic as new drivers seize the opportunity to travel on the larger road”, and thus no reduction in travel time. Gooch and Kahn further note that:

The presence of demand elasticity in decisions regarding ICU care has major implications for health care delivery and financing. Primarily, this indicates it is possible to reduce the costs of US hospital care by constraining ICU bed supply, perhaps through certificate of need laws or other legislation.

I offer a highly simplified sketch of how ICU over-utilization by those “not sick enough to benefit” is one driver of a vicious cycle in ICU cost growth.

icu-costs-fig-2

ICU over-utilization by patients “not sick enough to benefit” as a driver for ICU demand elasticity

Who (if anyone) is at fault for this ICU vicious cycle? Chang and Shapiro offer one suggestion:

For medical conditions where ICU care is frequently provided, but may not always be necessary, institutions that utilize ICUs more frequently are more likely to perform invasive procedures and have higher costs but have no improvement in hospital mortality. Hospitals had similar ICU utilization patterns across the 4 medical conditions, suggesting that systematic institutional factors may influence decisions to potentially overutilize ICU care.

Emphasis added. I note that demand elasticity is not in itself bad; it must simply be recognized, controlled and used appropriately. As part of a discussion in print on the role of cost considerations in medical decisions, Du and Kahn write:

Although we argue that costs should not be factored into medical decision-making in the ICU, this does not mean that we should not strive toward healthcare cost reduction in other ways. One strategy is to devise systems of care that prevent unnecessary or unwanted ICU admissions—given the small amount of ICU care that is due to discretionary spending, the only real way to reduce ICU costs is to prevent ICU admissions in the first place.

Du and Kahn also argue for careful cost-effectiveness analyses, such as that supported by NICE in the UK:

These programs limit use of treatments that are not cost-effective, taking cost decisions out of the hands of physicians and putting them where they belong: in the hands of society at large… We will achieve real ICU savings only by encouraging a society committed to system-based reforms.

Emphasis added. One can debate “taking cost decisions out of the hands of physicians”, though Guidet & Beale‘s and Capuzzo & Rhodes‘s argument for more physician awareness of cost might provide a good intermediate position in this debate.

Finally, increasing ICU supply (that is, ICU beds) in response to well-conceived increases in ICU demand is not in itself bad; ICU supply must be able to respond to demands imposed by disasters or other emergencies. We need to seek out novel ways to provide this capacity without incurring potentially unnecessary fixed costs, perhaps from region-wide stockpiling of supplies and equipment, and region-wide pools of on-call physicians and other ICU personnel. In summary, current health-related literature offers a wide-ranging discussion of the growing costs of intensive care; in my opinion: more questions than answers at this stage, but hopefully the questions will ultimately lead to answers.

Credits

#HEJC for 05/11/2012

This month’s meeting will take place Monday 5th November, at 8pm London time. That’ll be midday in Vancouver and 9pm in Berlin. Join the Facebook event here. For more information about the Health Economics Twitter Journal Club and how to take part, click here.

The paper for discussion this month is published as an Early View article in Health Economics and the authors are Christel E. van Dijk and colleagues. The title of the paper is:

“Moral hazard and supplier-induced demand: empirical evidence in general practice”

Following the meeting, a transcript of the discussion can be downloaded here.

Links to the article

Official: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/hec.2801/abstract

RePEc: http://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/hlthec/v22y2013i3p340-352.html

Other: http://nvl002.nivel.nl/postprint/PPpp3574.pdf

Summary of the paper

Supplier-induced demand and ex-post moral hazard are key issues in the study of health economics. In this study the authors utilise a change in the remuneration system in the Netherlands in 2006 to see if these dynamics could be observed. Cost sharing was abolished for consumers with private insurance, whose care was paid for on a fee-for-service basis, while socially insured consumers, whose care was paid for through capitation, never faced cost sharing. The system was changed such that both groups of consumers’ remuneration systems became a combined system of capitation and fee-for-service; altering the financial incentives of consumers and GPs. The authors hypothesise that privately insured consumers had a greater increase in the rate of patient-initiated GP contacts compared with the socially insured consumers. Furthermore it was hypothesised that socially insured consumers would experience a higher increase in physician-initiated contact rates. Electronic medical records were obtained from 32 GP practices and 35336 consumers in 2005-2007. The authors utilise difference-in-difference analysis to study the effect of the system changes on GP contact rates. The study finds that the abolition of cost sharing led to a higher increase in patient-initiated utilisation for privately insured consumers aged 65 or older. The introduction of a fee-for-service system for socially insured consumers resulted in a higher increase in physician-initiated contacts, and was most apparent in individuals aged 25 to 54. Differences in the trend in physician-initiated utilisation suggest an effect of supplier-induced demand. Differences in patient-initiated utilisation indicated limited evidence for moral hazard.

Discussion points

  • Are the authors’ assumptions reasonable and justified?
  • Are the econometric methods sound or could they be improved?
  • Does the model suffer from any endogeneity problems?
  • Can the results be generalised to other populations and systems?

Missed the meeting? Add your thoughts on the paper in the comments below.